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Abstract
During extreme financial crises, all of a sudden, the financial world that was once
rife with profit opportunities for financial institutions (banks, for short) becomes
exceedingly complex. Confusion and uncertainty follow, ravaging financial markets
and triggering massive flight-to-quality episodes. In this paper we propose a model
of this phenomenon. In our model, banks normally collect information about their
trading partners which assures them of the soundness of these relationships. How-
ever, when acute financial distress emerges in parts of the financial network, it is not
enough to be informed about these partners, as it also becomes important to learn
about the health of their trading partners. As conditions continue to deteriorate,
banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the trading partners
of the trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of information gathering
becomes too unmanageable for banks, uncertainty spikes, and they have no option
but to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A flight-to-quality
ensues, and the financial crisis spreads.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in investors' and banks' perceived uncertainty is at the core of the
2007-2009 U.S. financial crisis. All of a sudden, a financial world that was once rife
with profit opportunities for financial institutions (banks, for short), was perceived to be
exceedingly complex. Although the subprime shock was small relative to the financial
institutions' capital, banks acted as if most of their counterparties were severely exposed
to the shock (see Figure 1). Confusion and uncertainty followed, triggering the worst case
of flight-to-quality that we have seen in the U.S. since the Great Depression.
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Figure 1: The line corresponds to the TED spread in basis points (source: Bloomberg),
the interest rate difference between the interbank loans (3 month LIBOR) and the US
government debt (3 month Treasury bills). An increase in the TED spread typically
reflects a higher perceived risk of default on interbank loans, that is, an increase in the
banks' perceptions of counterparty risk.
In this paper Ave present a model of the sudden rise in complexity, followed by wide-
spread panic in the financial sector. In the model, banks normally collect, information
about their direct trading partners which serves to assure them of the soundness of these
relationships. However, when acute financial distress emerges in parts of the financial
network, it is not enough to be informed about these partners, but it also becomes impor-
tant for the banks to learn about the health of their trading partners. And as conditions
continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the
trading partners, of their trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of informa-
tion gathering becomes too large and banks, now facing enormous uncertainty, choose to
withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A flight-to-quality ensues, and
the financial crisis spreads.
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The starting point of our framework is a standard liquidity model where banks (rep-
resenting financial institutions more broadly) have bilateral linkages in order to insure
against local liquidity shocks. The whole financial system is a complex network of link-
ages which functions smoothly in the environments that it is designed to handle, even
though no bank knows with certainty all the many possible connections within the net-
work (that is, each bank knows the identities of the other banks but not their exposures).
However, these linkages may also be the source of contagion when an unexpected event
of financial distress arises somewhere in the network. Our point of departure with the
literature is that we use this contagion mechanism not as the main object of study but
as the source of confusion and financial panic. During normal times, banks only need to
understand the financial health of their neighbors, which they can learn at low cost. In
contrast, when a significant problem arises in parts of the network and the possibility of
cascades arises, the number of nodes to be audited by each bank rises since it is possible
that the shock may spread to the bank's counterparties. Eventually the problem becomes
too complex for them to fully figure out, which means that banks now face significant
uncertainty and they react to it by retrenching into liquidity-conservation mode.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. There is an extensive literature
that highlights the possibility of network failures and contagion in financial markets.
An incomplete list includes Allen and Gale (2000), Lagunoff and Schreft (2000), Rochet
and Tirole (1996), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Leitner (2005), Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), Cifuentes, Ferucci and Shin (2005) (see Allen and Babus (2008) for a recent
survey). These papers focus mainly on the mechanisms by which solvency and liquidity
shocks may cascade through the financial network. In contrast, we take these phenomena
as the reason for the rise in the complexity of the environment in which banks make
their decisions, and focus on the effect of this complexity on banks' prudential actions.
In this sense, our paper is related to the literature on flight-to-quality and Knightian
uncertainty in financial markets, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Routledge
and Zin (2004) and Easley and O'Hara (2005); and also to the related literature that
investigates the effect of new events and innovations in financial markets, e.g. Liu, Pan,
and Wang (2005), Brock and Manski (2008) and Simsek (2009). Our contribution relative
to this literature is in endogenizing the rise in uncertainty from the behavior of the financial
network itself. More broadly, this paper belongs to an extensive literature on flight-to-
quality and financial crises that highlights the connection between panics and a decline in
the financial system's ability to channel resources to the real economy (see, e.g., Caballero
and Kurlat (2008), for a survey).
We build our argument in several steps. In Section 2 we first characterize the financial

network and describe a rare event as a perturbation to the structure of banks' shocks.
Specifically, one bank suffers an unfamiliar liquidity shock for which it was unprepared. We
next show that if banks can costlessly gather information about the network structure, the
spreading of this shock into precautionary responses by other banks is typically contained.
This scenario with no network uncertainty is the benchmark for our main results and is
similar (although with an interior equilibrium) to Allen and Gale (2000).
Our main contribution is in Section 3, where we make information gathering costly. In
this context, if the cascade is small, either because the liquidity shock is limited or because
banks' buffers are significant, banks are able to gather the information they need about
their indirect exposure to the liquidity shock and we are back to the full information results
of Section 2. However, once cascades are large enough, banks are unable to collect the
information they need to rule out a severe indirect hit. Their response to this uncertainty
is to hoard liquidity and to retrench on their lending, which triggers a credit crunch. In
Section 4 we show that under certain conditions, the response in Section 3 can be so
extreme, that the entire financial system can collapse as a result of the flight to quality.
The paper concludes with a final remarks section and several appendices.
2 The Environment and a Free-Information Bench-
mark
In this section we first introduce the environment and the characteristics of the financial
network along with a shock which was unanticipated at the network formation stage (i.e.
the financial network was not designed to deal with this shock). We next characterize
the equilibrium for a benchmark case in which information gathering is free so that the
market participants know the financial network.
2.1 The Environment
There are three dates {0. 1,2}. There is a single good (one dollar) that serves as numeraire,
which can be kept in liquid reserves or it can be loaned to production firms. If kept in
liquid reserves, a unit of the good yields one unit in the next date. Instead, if a unit
is loaned to firms at date 0, it then yields R > 1 units at date 2 if it is not unloaded
before this date. At date 1, the lender can unload the loan (e.g. by settling it with the
borrower at a discount) and receive r < 1 units. To simplify the notation, we assume
r % throughout this paper.

Banks and Their Liquidity Needs
The economy has 2n continuums of banks denoted by {b3 }~_
1
. Each of these continuums
is composed of identical banks and, for simplicity, we refer to each continuum b3 as bank
b3 , which is our unit of analysis. 1 Each bank b3 has initial assets which consist of y units
of liquid reserves set aside for liquidity payments, fjo < I — y units of flexible reserves set
aside for making new loans at date (but which can also be hoarded as liquid reserves)
and 1 — y — yo units of loans. The bank's liabilities consist of a measure one of demand
deposit contracts. A demand deposit contract pays l } > 1 at date 1 if the depositor is
hit by a liquidity shock and ^ > h at date 2 if the depositor is not hit by a liquidity
shock. Let u3
€ [0, 1] be the measure of liquidity-driven depositors of bank b3 (i.e. the
size of the liquidity shock experienced by the bank), which takes one of the three values
in {<Z\uL ,uH } with ujh > lol and u> = (u>H + uiL ) /2, and suppose
y — l\(I) and (1 — y) R = 1 2 Cj.
Note that, if the size of the liquidity shock is Cu, the bank that loans all of its flexible
reserves j/n at date has assets just enough to pay l\ (resp. U) to earl}' (resp. late)
depositors. The central trade-off in this economy will be whether the bank will loan its
flexible reserves yo (which it set aside for this purpose) or whether it will hoard some of
this liquidity as a precautionary response to a rare event that we describe below.
The Financial Network
The liquidity needs at date 1 may not be evenly distributed among banks, which highlights
one of the (man}') reasons for an interlinked financial network. Moreover, the main source
of complexity later on will be confusion about the linkages between different banks. To
capture this possibility we let i E {1, .., 2ra} denote slots in a financial network and consider
a permutation p : {1. .., 2n} —> {1, .., 2n} that assigns bank bp^ to slot i. We consider a
financial network denoted by:
b (p ) = (bp(1) -> 6" (2) -> ^ (3) - .... -» bpW ^ 6P(i)) ) (!)
where the arc —» denotes that the bank in slot ? (i.e., bank bp{- l) ) has a demand deposit in
the bank in the subsequent slot i + 1 (i.e., bank bp^ +l) ) equal to
z = (Q-uL ), (2)
The only reason for the continuum is for banks to take other banks' decisions as given.

where we use modulo 2n arithmetic for the slot index i 2 We refer to bank 6p ('+1 ) as the
forward neighbor of bank bp^ (and similarly, to bank bp ^ l) as the backward neighbor of
bank fr^ !+1 ) ). The possibility of confusion arises later on from banks knowing the identity
of other banks but not their particular linkages (i.e., the actual permutation p).
As we formally describe in Appendix A.l (and similar to Allen-Gale (2000)), in the
normal environment, the financial network facilitates liquidity insurance and enables liq-
uidity to flow from banks that experience a low liquidity shock (ujl ) to the banks that
experience a high liquidity shock (ww ). even when the financial network b [p) is unknown
to the banks. Our focus is on the effect of the financial interlinkages in case of an unan-
ticipated shock for which the financial network is not necessarily designed for, which we
describe next.
A Rare Event
At date the banks learn that all banks will experience the average liquidity shock uj at
date 1, however, they also learn that one bank, b3 , becomes distressed and loses 6 < y of its
liquid assets. As we formally demonstrate below, the losses in the distressed bank b3 might
spill over to the other banks via the financial network b [p), thus the banks' knowledge of
the financial network is potentially payoff relevant. In particular, this knowledge influences
whether the banks use the flexible reserves j/n to make new loans or to hoard liquidity. We
are thus lead to describe the central feature of our model: the banks ' uncertainty about
the financial network b (p).
Network Uncertainty and Auditing Technology
We let
B = {b (p) | p : {1, .., 2n} —> {1, ,.,2n} is a permutation} . (3)
denote the set of possible financial networks. Each bank b3 observes its slot i = p~ l (j)
and the identities of the banks in its neighboring slots i — 1 and i + 1. This information
narrows down the potential networks to the set:
B3 (p)= (h{p)<EB
p(i-l) = p(i-l)
p(i) = p(i)
I p(i + l) = p(i + l)
,
where i = p
l
(j)
-In particular, i represents the slot with index i' £ {l,...2n} that is the modulo In equivalent of
integer i. For example, i — 2n+l represents the slot with index 1.

Figure 2: The financial network and uncertainty. The bottom-left box displays the
actual financial network. Each circle corresponds to a slot in the financial network, and in
this realization of the network, each slot i contains bank b 1 (i.e. p (i) = i). The remaining
boxes show the other networks that bank 6 1 finds plausible after observing its neighbors
(i.e. the set B l (p)). Bank b l cannot tell how the banks {b5 .b4 ,b 5 } are ordered in slots
{3.4.5}.
areNote that the bank b3 does not know how the remaining banks (V)-*,,^^ ,
{
,
„/i+ x)\
assigned to the remaining slots (see Figure 2). In particular, each bank b3 ^ b3 knows
that the bank b3 is distressed, but it does not necessarily know the slot
i=P~ l Q)
of the distressed bank. This is key, since it means that a bank b3 ^ b3 does not necessarily
know how jar removed it is from the distressed bank.
Each bank b3 can acquire more information about the financial network through an
auditing technology. At date 0, a bank b3 in slot i (i.e. with j = p(i)) can exert effort
to audit its forward neighbor 6p(i+1 ' in order to learn the identity of this bank's forward
neighbor bp(-'^ 2 ^ . Continuing this way, a bank V that audits a number, a3
,
of balance
sheets learns the identity of its a3 + 1 forward neighbors and narrows the set of potential

financial networks to:
B> (p | a3 ) = { b (p) £ B
p(i-l) = p(i-l)
_
p{i + a 3 + 1) = p(t + a3 + 1)
,
where i = p (j)
We denote the posterior beliefs of bank b3 with f3 (. | p,a3 ) which has support equal to
B3 (p. a3 ) given assumption:
Assumption (FS). Each bank has a prior belief f3 (.) over B with full support.
In the example illustrated in Figure 2, if bank b 1 audits one balance sheet, then it would
learn that bank b3 is assigned to slot 3 and it would narrow down the set of networks to
the two boxes at the left hand side of the bottom row in Figure 2.
Bank Preferences and Equilibrium
Consider a bank b3 and denote the bank's actual payments to early and late depositors
by q\ and qi (which may in principle be different than the contracted values l^ and
/ 2 ). Because banks are infinitesimal, they make decisions taking the payments of the
other banks as given. The bank makes the audit and liquidity hoarding decisions, a 3 E
{0,1. ,..,277 — 3} and y
3 E [0,yo], at date (equivalently, j/o — y
J E <0,j/oi denotes the
number of new loans the bank makes at date 0). At date 1, the bank chooses to withdraw
some of its deposits in the neighbor bank, which we denote by z3 E [0, z], and it may also
unload some of its outstanding loans. The bank makes these decisions to maximize q\
until it can meet its liquidity obligations to depositors, that is, until q\ = l\. Increasing
q\ beyond l\ has no benefit for the bank, thus once it satisfies its liquidity obligations, it
then tries to maximize the return to the late depositors q\.
We capture this behavior with the following objective function
«(lW</i}g{' + lW>Zi}^)-d(aO (4)
where v : R+ —> K++ is a strictly concave and strictly increasing function and d(.) is an
increasing and convex function which captures the bank's non-monetary disutility from
auditing. When the bank b3 is making a decision that would lead to an uncertain outcome
for (qi^qi) (which will be the case in Section 3), then it maximizes the expectation of the
expression in (4) given its posterior beliefs fJ (. | p, a3 ).
Suppose that the depositors' early/late liquidity shocks are observable, and a bank
which is able to pay its late depositors at least l\ at date 2 can refuse to pay the late

Banks' Initial Balance Sheets
Assets: Liabilities:
- y liquid reserves
- Date 1 payment to early
depositors: Dl^ = y
- yo tiexible reserves
- Date 2 pavment to late
- 1 — y — po loans. depositors: Qlz = (1 — y)R
- j demand depodts in - ? demand deposit: neld by
forward neighbor bank backward neighbor bank.
Date
Banks learn that
- Each will have shod; u> frerlected on above balance sheetcl.
- Ba.nk b1 becomes distressed and loses 8 liquid reserves
Banks make the audit dedsion a 1 6 {0,1, 3}.
Banks moke the liquidity hoarding decidon y'
€ [0,§ ]
(Equivalent!}- banks extend y — y^ new loans,)
Date 1
Banks moke the depodt withdrawal
dedsion ,- ; e [0,;j.
Early depodtors demand their deposits
Late depodtors demand tneir deposits
if and only if the bo.nl; cannot promise ql
Insolvent banks (that pay q{ < /]!
unload all of their outstanding loans
Date 2
Banks pay qi to la,te depodtors.
Figure 3: Timeline of events.
depositors if they arrive early. 3 With this assumption, the continuation equilibrium for
bank V at date 1 takes one of two forms. Either there is a no-liquidation equilibrium in
which the bank is solvent and pays
q{ = li,q
3
2 >k, (5)
while the late depositors withdraw at date 2; or there is a liquidation equilibrium in which
the bank is insolvent, unloads all outstanding loans, and pays
q{ < lu 4 = 0, (6)
while all depositors (including the late depositors) draw their deposits at date 1.
Figure 3 recaps the timeline of events in this economy. We formally define the equi-
librium as follows.
Definition 1. The equilibrium, is a collection of bank auditing, liquidity hoarding, deposit
withdrawal, and payment decisions {a^p),yi(p) ) ^(p),ql(p),qJ2 (p)} j such that,b(p)£B
given the realization of the financial network b (p) and the rare event, each bank b3 maxi-
3 Without this assumption, there could be multiple equilibria for late depositors' early/late withdrawal
decisions. In cases with multiple equilibria, this assumption selects the equilibrium in which no late
depositor withdraws.

raizes expected utility in (4) according to its prior belief fJ (.) over B, the insolvent banks
(with q\ (p) < l\) unload all of their outstanding loans at date 1 and the late depositors
withdraw deposits early if and only if q^ (p) < l\ (cf. Eqs. (5) and {&)).
We next turn to the characterization of equilibrium. Note that for each financial
network b (p) and for each bank b3 , there exists a unique k G {0, .., 2n — 1} such that
j = p(i- k)
,
which we define as the distance of bank b3 from the distressed bank. As we will see,
the distance k will be the payoff relevant information for a bank b3 that decides how
much liquidity to hoard at date since it will determine whether or not the crisis that
originates at the distressed bank b3 will cascade to bank b3 . The banks bp^~ l \ bp^ , bp(- l+1 \
respectively with distances 1, and 2n — 1, know their distances, but the remaining banks
(with distances k
€ {2. ... 2n — 2}) do not have this information a priori and they assign a
positive probability to each k £ {2, .., 2n — 2} (they rule out k e {1, 2n - 1} by observing
their forward and backwards neighbors). Note, however, that the bank b3 can use the
auditing technology to learn about the financial network and, in particular, about its
distance from the distressed bank. A bank bp^~h ' (with distance k) that audits a 3 > 1
banks either learns its distance k (if k < a? .+ 1) or it learns that k > a3 + 2.
In the remaining half of this section, we characterize the equilibrium in a benchmark
case in which auditing is free so each bank learns its distance from the distressed bank.
In subsequent sections, we characterize the equilibrium with costly audit and compare it
with the free-information benchmark.
2.2 Free-Information Benchmark
We first describe a benchmark case in which auditing is free so each bank bp ^ x~ k > chooses
full auditing ap^~ k} = 2n — 3. In this context banks learn the whole financial network
b (p) and, in particular, their distances.
At date all banks anticipate receiving a liquidity shock, Co, at date 1 and have liquid
reserves equal to y — CjIi (plus y of flexible reserves), except for bank b3 = 6
p(i
' which has
liquid reserves y — 9. At date 1, the distressed bank bp^ withdraws its deposits from the
forward neighbor bank. As we show in Appendix A. 2, this triggers further withdrawals
until, in equilibrium, all cross deposits are withdrawn. That is
z
3 = z Vje{l,..,2n}. (7)

In particular, bank bp^ tries, but cannot, obtain any net liquidity through cross with-
drawals. The bank also cannot obtain any liquidity by unloading the loans at date 1, since
each unit of unloaded loan yields r « 0. Anticipating that it will not be able to obtain
additional liquidity at date 1, the distressed bank bp^ hoards some its flexible reserves y
by cutting new loans at date in order to meet its liquidity demand at date 1.
In order to promise late depositors at least / l5 a bank with no liquid reserves left at
the end of date 1 must have at least
i-y-g.Ozm (8)
units of loans. The level yj is a natural limit on a bank's liquidity hoarding (which plans
to deplete all of its liquidity at date 1) since any choice above this would make the bank
necessarily insolvent. If the amount of flexible reserves y"o is greater than yj . then the bank
can hoard at most y"o of the flexible reserves while remaining solvent; or else it can hoard
all of the flexible reserves yo- Combining the two cases, a bank's buffer is given by
j3 = min {j/o,yo} •
A bank can accommodate losses in liquid reserves up to the buffer 3, but becomes insolvent
when losses are beyond 3. It follows that the distressed bank 6p(l) will be insolvent
whenever
> P, (9)
that is, whenever its losses in liquid reserves are greater than its buffer. Suppose this is
the case so bank 6/,(l) is insolvent. Anticipating insolvency, this bank will hoard as much
liquidity as it can y$ = y"o (since it maximizes ql ) and unloads all remaining loans at
date 1. Since the bank is insolvent, all depositors (including late depositors) arrive early
and the bank pays
where recall that gf denotes bank 6^'
+1
''s payment to early depositors (which is equal
to /] if bank bp(l+l) is solvent).
Partial Cascades. Since bank bp^ is insolvent, its backward neighbor bank bp^~ l > will
experience losses in its cross deposit holdings, which, if severe enough, may cause bank
£,p(i-!)-
s insolvency. Once the crisis cascades to bank bp(- l~ l\ it may then similarly cascade
to bank bp<~'~ 2\ continuing its cascade through the network in this fashion.
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We conjecture that, under appropriate parametric conditions, there exists a threshold
K
€ {1, ..,2n — 2} such that all banks with distance k < K — 1 are insolvent (there are
K such banks) while the banks with distance k > K remain solvent. In other words, the
crisis will partially cascade through the network but will be contained after K < 2n — 2
banks have failed. We refer to K as the cascade size.
Under this conjecture, bank bp^+1\ which has a distance 2n — 1, is solvent. Therefore
q
p(
-' = /
:
and cfi in Eq. (10) can be calculated explicitly. Consider now the bank
^p(r-i)
^,'i-j-j distance 1 from the distressed bank. To remain solvent, this bank needs to
pay l\ on its deposits to bank 6p( ' _2) but it receives only q
p
< /] on its deposits from the
distressed bank bpl<L \ so it loses z il\ — q
p
j in cross-deposits. Hence, bank bpl-
L~ l>
will
also go bankrupt if and only if its losses from cross-deposits are greater than its buffer,
'i
—
*?i )
> ^i which can be rewritten as
qf] <h--
z
- (11)
If this condition fails, then the only insolvent bank is the original distressed bank and the
cascade size is K = 1. If this condition holds, then bank bpii ~ 1 ^ anticipates insolvency, it
will hoard as much liquidity as it can, i.e. j/q = y and it will pay all depositors
•T" - / (O - !+*£*?.. (12,
From this point onwards, a pattern emerges. The payment by an insolvent bank {/,(, ~ fc)
(with k > 1) is given by
qf-
k)
= f (qf-
{k-' ])
)
and this bank's backward neighbor bp^~^ k+l ^ is also insolvent if and only if q
p
' < lj — -
.
Hence, the payments of the insolvent banks converge to the fixed point of the function
/(.) given by y -f y , and if
Q
y + yo > h—
,
(13)
'J
If condition (13) fails, then the sequence lq^' = f (q
p
'
) )
always remains below li — -,
and it can be checked that there is a full cascade, i.e. all banks are insolvent.
, !

then (under Eq. (11)) there exists a unique K > 2 such that
qf'
k)
<h-- for each k e {0. ... K - 2} (14)
, p{T-(K-\)) . , 8
and <7j > m •
If 2n — 2 is greater than the solution, A', to this equation, i.e. if
2n - 2 > A', (15)
then, Eq. (14) shows that (in addition to the trigger-distressed bank 6p(!) ) all banks
bp( L
~ k
) with distance k 6 {1,...A' — 1} are insolvent since their losses from cross de-
posits are greater than their corresponding buffers. In contrast, bank bp(l ~ h) (that re-
ceives q
p from its forward neighbor) is solvent, since it can meet its losses from
cross deposits by hoarding some liquidity while still promising the late depositors at
least h (i.e. qf~
K)
> h). Since bank b
p{J- K)
is solvent, all banks bp{T- k) with dis-
tance k 6 {K + l,..,2n — 1} are also solvent since they do not incur losses in cross-
deposits. Hence these banks do not hoard any liquidity, j/q = 0, and they pay
( <7i
= h,<J
P
~
^2 ) i
verifying our conjecture for a partial cascade of size K under
conditions (13) and (15).
Since our goal is to study the role of network uncertainty in generating a credit crunch,
we take the partial cascades as the benchmark. The next proposition summarizes the
above discussion and also characterizes the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, which
we use as a benchmark in subsequent sections.
Proposition 1. Suppose the financial network is realized as b(p), auditing is free, and
conditions (9), (13) and (15) hold. For a given financial network b(p), let J = p~ l (j)
denote the slot of the distressed bank.
(i) For the continuation equilibrium (at date I): The banks' equilibrium payments
( 9i • ?2 ) are (weakly) increasing with respect to their distance k from the distressed
bank and there is a partial cascade of size K < 2n — 2 where K is defined by Eq. (14).
In particular, banks {frp(t~^},
n
(with distance from the distressed bank k < A' — I) are
insolvent while the remaining banks {bpi-'~ k ^} (with distance k > K) are solvent.
(ii) For the ex-ante equilibrium (at date 0): Banks {bp^~ k
'
>
} , _n hoard as much liquidity
as they can and unload all of their existing loans at date 1, while banks {i>p(t
~ fc)
}
do not hoard any liquidity or unload any loans. Bank bp<" L~ h ^ hoards a level of liquidity
j/q
!
= z ( l\ — q
p
' ) which is just enough to meet its losses from cross deposits
(and does not unload any loans).
12
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Figure 4: The free-information benchmark. The top figure plots the cascade size
K as a function of the losses in the originating bank 9, for different levels of the flexible
reserves y~o. The bottom figure plots the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, !F, for the
same set of {y~o}.
The aggregate level of liquidity hoarding is:
T
- 5Z yo = Kvo + yo
{L ~ A')
(16)
Discussion. Proposition 1 shows that, under appropriate parametric conditions, the
equilibrium features a partial cascade and the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, J-',
is roughly linear in the size of the cascade K (and is roughly continuous in 0). Figure 4
demonstrates this result for particular parameterization of the model.
The top panel of the figure plots the cascade size K as a function of the losses in
the originating bank 9 for different levels of the flexible reserves j/o- This plot shows
that the cascade size is increasing in the level of losses 6 and decreasing in the level of
flexible reserves y . Intuitively, with a higher 9 and a lower y , there are more losses to
be contained and the banks have less emergency reserves to counter these losses, thus
increasing the spread of insolvency.
The bottom panel plots the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding JF which is a measure
of the severity of the credit crunch, as a function of 9. This plot shows that T also increases
with 9 and falls with y . This is an intuitive result: In the free-information benchmark
only the insolvent banks (and one transition bank) hoard liquidity, thus the more banks
are insolvent (i.e. the greater K) the more liquidity is hoarded in the aggregate. Note
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also that T increases "smoothly" with 9.
These results offer a benchmark for the next sections. There we show that once audit-
ing becomes costly, both A' and T may be non-monotonic in y anch more importantly,
can jump with small increases in 9
.
3 Endogenous Complexity and the Credit Crunch
We have now laid out the foundation for our main result. In this section we add the
realistic assumption that auditing is costly and demonstrate that a massive credit crunch
can arise in response to an endogenous increase in complexity once a bank in the network
is sufficiently distressed. In other words, when A" is large, it becomes too costly for banks
to figure out their indirect exposure. This means that their perceived uncertainty rises
and they eventually respond bj' hoarding liquidity as a precautionary measure (i.e., T
spikes).
Note that, unlike in Section 2.2, we cannot simplify the analysis by solving the equilib-
rium for a particular financial network b (p) in isolation, since, even when the realization
of the financial network is b(p), each bank also assigns a positive probability to other
financial networks b (p) 6 B. As such, for a consistent analysis we must describe the
equilibrium for any realization of the financial network b (p) £ B (cf. Definition 1).
Solving this problem in full generality is cumbersome but we make assumptions on
the form of the adjustment cost function, the banks' objective function, and on the level
of flexible reserves, that help simplify the exposition. First, we consider a convex and
increasing cost function d (.) that satisfies
d{l) = and d(2)>v(l 1 + l2)-v(0). (17)
This means that banks can audit one balance sheet for free but it is very costly to audit
the second balance sheet. In particular, given the bank's preferences in (4), the bank will
never choose to audit the second balance sheet and thus each bank audits exactly one
balance sheet, {a3 (p) = 1} . Given these audit decisions and the actual financial
L
J Jb( P )e/3
network b (p), a bank IP has a posterior belief fJ {.\p,l) with support BJ (p,l), which is
the set of financial networks in which the bank j knows the identities of its neighbors
and its second forward neighbor. In particular, the bank 6p( '~ 2) learns its distance from
the distressed bank bp(l) (in addition to banks 6pl ' 1)
,
6p(l>
,
6p(,+1) which already have this
information from the outset). We denote the set of banks that know the slot of the
1 !

distressed bank (and thus their distance from this bank) by
B know (p ) = {bp^- 2\bp(I
- l)
.bp{1) ,b
p{T+l)
} .
On the other hand, each bank &^' -,c > with k 6 {3,..,2n-2} learns that its distance
is at least 3 (i.e. k > 3), but otherwise assigns a probability in (0. 1) to all distances
k 6 {3. ... 2n — 2}. We denote the set of banks that are uncertain about their distance by
^uncertain i \ _ np(r-3) ^p(T-4) ^p(J-{2n-2)) \
Second, we assume that the preference function v (.) in (4) is Leontieff v (x) =
(x l
~a
— 1) / (1 — a) with a —> oo, so that the bank's objective is:
mm (1 {q{ (p) < h} q{ (p) + 1 {^ (p) > I,} qi (p)) - d {a? (p)) . (18)
b(p)£BJ(p,l)
This means that banks evaluate their decisions according to the worst possible network
realization, b(p), which they find plausible.
The third and last assumption is that
yo < PS- (19)
That is, the bank has less flexible reserves than the natural limit on liquidity hoarding
defined in Eq. (8) (which also implies that the buffer is given by 3 = j/o)- This condition
ensures that, in the continuation equilibrium at date 1. the banks that have enough
liquidity are also solvent (since, no matter how much of their flexible reserves they hoard,
they have enough loans to pay the late depositors at least l\ at date 2). We drop this
condition in the next section.
We next turn to the characterization of the equilibrium under these simplifying as-
sumptions. The banks make their liquidity hoarding decision at date and deposit with-
drawal decision at date 1 under uncertainty (before their date 1 losses from cross-deposits
are realized). At date 1 the distressed bank bp ^ x) withdraws its deposits from the forward
neighbor which leads to the withdrawal of all cross deposits (see Eq. (7) and Appendix
A. 2) as in the free-information benchmark. Thus, for any distressed bank, the only way
to obtain additional liquidity at date 1 is through hoarding liquidity at date 0, which we
characterize next.
L5

A Sufficient Statistic for Liquidity Hoarding. Consider a bank bp^~ k) other than
the original distressed bank (i.e.. A; > 0). A sufficient statistic for this bank to make
the' liquidity hoarding decision is q
p ''
(p) < li, which is the amount it receives in
equilibrium from its forward neighbor. In other words, to decide how much of its flexible
reserves to hoard, this bank only needs to know whether (and how much) it will lose in
cross-deposits. For example, if it knows with certainty that q
p
(p) = li (i.e. its
forward neighbor is solvent), then it hoards no liquidity, i.e. y^ ' = 0. If it knows with
certainty that q
p
(p) < li — fi/z (i.e. its forward neighbor will pay so little that this
bank will also be insolvent), then it hoards as much liquidity as it can, i.e. y^ = y .
More generally, if the bank bp^~ k) hoards some y' G [0, j/o] at date and its forward
neighbor pays x = q
P
' (p) &t date 1, then this bank's payment can be written as
qf-
k)
{p) = q,\y'(y x} and qf
~ k}
(p) = q2 [y' , x] , (20)
where the functions qi[y' ,x] and cj2[y' ..x] are characterized in Eqs. (26) and (27) in
Appendix A. 2. At date 0, the bank does not necessarily know x — q
p
(p) and it
has to choose the level of liquidity hoarding under uncertainty.
The characterization in Appendix A. 2 also shows that q-y [y' , x] and q2 [y' , x] are
(weakly) increasing in x for any given y'Q . That is, the bank's payment is increasing
in the amount it receives from its forward neighbor regardless of the ex-ante liquidity
hoarding decision. Using this observation along with Eq. (20), the bank's objective value
in (18) can be simplified and its optimization problem can be written as
max (1 { Ql [y' ,x
m
] > hjq, \y'Q ,x
m
} + 1 {9l {y' .x
m
} >l l }q2 \y' .x
m
}) , (21)
y e|0.yo]
s.t. x
m
= min fx\z = ^- (*_1» (p) , b (p) G B1 (p,l)}
In words, a bank bp^ k ^ (with k > 0) hoards liquidity as if it will receive from its forward
neighbor the lowest possible payment xm .
Distance Based and Monotonic Equilibrium. Next, we define two equilibrium al-
location notions that are useful for further characterization. First, we say that the equi-
librium allocation is distance based if the bank's equilibrium payment can be written only
as a function of its distance k from the distressed bank, that is, if there exists payment
functions Q\,Qi : {0. ... 2n — 1} —> R such that
(q?-k) (p),4
{i~ k)
(p)) = (Qi[k},Q2[k])
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for all b (p) 6 B and k E {0, .., 2n — 1}. Second, we say that a distance based equilibrium
is monotonia if the payment functions Qi [k] , Qi [k] are (weakly) increasing in k. In words,
in a distance based and monotonic equilibrium, the banks that are further away from the
distressed bank yield (weakly) higher payments.
We next conjecture that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic (which we
verify below). Then, a bank 6p(, ~^'s uncertainty about the forward neighbor's payment
x = q
p l ~
(p) = Q] [k - 1] reduces to its uncertainty about the forward neighbor's
distance k — 1, which is equal to one less than its own distance k. Hence, the problem
in (21) can further be simplified by substituting q
p
(p) = Qi [k — 1]. In particular,
since a bank bp(l ' k) 6 B know {p) (for k > 0) knows its distance k, it solves problem (21)
with xm = Q 1 [k-l].
On the other hand, a bank bp ^ l ~ k> G B uncertairi ^ assigns a positive probability to all
distances k G {3, ...,2n — 2}. Moreover, since the equilibrium is monotonic, its forward
neighbor's payment Qi k — 1 is minimal for the distance fc = 3, hence a bank b?^ G
^uncertain
^ sq[wqs problem (21) With X™ = Q X [2].
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section, which shows that all
banks that are uncertain about their distances to the distressed bank hoard liquidity as if
they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are.
More specifically, all banks in B uncertam (p) hoard the level of liquidity that the bank
with distance k — 3 would hoard in the free-information benchmark. When the cascade
size is sufficiently large (i.e. A' > 3) so that the bank with distance k = 3 in the free-
information benchmark would hoard extensive liquidity, all banks in B unceTtain (^ with
actual distances k > K also hoard large amounts of
,
even though they end up not needing
it.
To state the result, we let (j^jree (p) . q{jree (p) , Qojree (p)) denote the liquidity hoard-
ing decisions and payments of banks in the free-information benchmark for each financial
network b (p) 6 B (characterized in Proposition 1).
Proposition 2. Suppose assumptions (FS), (17), and (18) are satisfied and conditions
(9), (13), (15), and (19) hold. For a given financial network b (p), let i — p~ l (j) denote
the slot of the distressed bank.
(i) For the continuation equilibrium (at date 1): The equilibrium allocation is distance
based and monotonic. The cascade size in the continuation equilibrium is the same as in
the free-information benchmark, that is. at date 1, banks {bp^~ k%> } are insolvent while
banks {bp(l ~ k) } are solvent where K is defined in Eq. (14).
(li) For the ex-ante equilibrium (at date 0): Each bank b> 6 Bknow (p) hoards the same
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level of liquidity j/q (p) = y
J
jree (p) as in the free-information benchmark, while each bank
b> e B uncertain (p) hoards yJ {p) = Vqj'H [p), which is the level of liquidity bank bp^~ 3
'>
would hoard in the free-information benchmark.
For the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, there are three cases depending on the
cascade size K
:
If K < 2. then the crisis in the free-information benchmark would not cascade to
bank 6p(,
~ 3
', which would hoard no liquidity, i.e. y$ \Tee (p) = 0- Thus, each bank bP £
^uncertain
^ hoards no liquidity and the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding is equal to
the benchmark Eq. (16).
If K = 3, then the crisis in the free-information benchmark would cascade to and stop
at bank bpi-'~ 3] . which would hoard an intermediate level of liquidity y$ \ £, (p) £ [0,yo].
Thus, each bank bP £ ^uncertain ^ hoards y
P
i
\~
ee (p) and the aggregate level of liquidity
hoarding is:
^ =W = 3y + (2n - 4) y^] . (22)
3
If K > 4, then in the free-information benchmark bank 6P ' !_3) would be insolvent
and would hoard as much liquidity as it can. i.e. yQjree — yo- Thus, each bank bP 6
^uncertain
^^ hoards as much liquidity as it can and the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding
is:
T = Y,y
J
o
= (°-n-l)yo- (23)
3
The proof of this result is relegated to Appendix A. 2 since most of the intuition is
provided in the discussion preceding the proposition. Among other features, the proof
verifies that the equilibrium allocation at date 1 is distance based and monotonic, and
that the cascade size is the same as in the free-information benchmark. The date
liquidity hoarding decisions are characterized as in part (ii) since the payments Q\ [k — 1]
for k E {l,2,2n- 1} (that a bank bp{T- k) G B know (p) with k > expects to receive) and
the payment Qi [2] (that the banks in B vncertain (p) effectively expect to receive) are the
same as their counterparts in the free-information benchmark.
Discussion. The plots in Figure 5 are the equivalent to those in the free-information
case portrayed in Figure 4. The top panel plots the cascade size K as a function of
the losses in the originating bank 8. The parameters satisfy condition (19) so that the
cascade size in this case is the same as the cascade size in the free-information benchmark
characterized in Proposition 1, and both figures coincide.
The key differences are in the bottom panel, which plots the aggregate level of liquidity
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Figure 5: The costly-audit equilibrium. The top panel plots the cacade size K as a
function of the losses in the originating bank 6 for different levels of the flexible reserves
yQ . The bottom panel plots aggregate level of liquidity hoarding T for the same set of
{y~o}- The dashed lines in the bottom panel reproduce the free-information benchmark in
Figure 4 for comparison.
hoarding J7 as a function of 6. The solid lines correspond to the costly audit equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 2, while the dashed lines reproduce the free-information
benchmark also plotted in Figure 4. These plots demonstrate that, for low levels of K (i.e.
for K < 3), the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding with costly-auditing is the same as the
free-information benchmark, in particular, it increases roughly continuously with 9. As
K switches from below 3 to above 3, the liquidity hoarding in the costly audit equilibrium
make a very large and discontinuous jump. That is, when the losses (measuring the
severity of the initial shock) are beyond a threshold, the cascade size becomes so large
that banks are unable to tell whether they are connected to the distressed bank. All
uncertain banks act as if they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are,
hoarding much more liquidity than in the free-information benchmark and leading to a
severe credit crunch episode. This is our main result.
Note also that the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding (and the severity of the credit
crunch) is not necessarily monotonic in the level of flexible reserves y . For example,
when 6 = 0.5, Figure 5 shows that providing more flexibility to the banks by increasing
f/o actually increases the level of aggregate liquidity hoarding. That is, at low levels of
6, an increase in flexibility stabilizes the system but the opposite may take place when
the shock is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if the increase in flexibility is not sufficient
l'j

to contain the financial panic (by reducing the cascade size to manageable levels), more
flexibility backfires since it enables banks to hoard more liquidity and therefore exacerbate
the credit crunch.
4 The Collapse of the Financial System
Until now, the uncertainty that arises from endogenous complexity affects the extent of
the credit crunch but not the number of banks that are insolvent, K. In this section we
show that if banks have "too much" flexibility, in the sense that condition (19) no longer
holds and
Vo e (yl 1 - y) (24)
(which also implies j3 = y£), then the rise in uncertainty itself can increase the number of
insolvent banks.
The reason is that a large precautionary liquidity hoarding compromises banks' long
run profitability by giving up high return R for low return 1. In this context, even if the
worst outcome anticipated by a bank does not materialize, it may still become insolvent
if sufficiently close (but farther than K) from the distressed bank. In other words, a
bank's large precautionary reaction improves its liquidation outcome when very close to
the distressed bank but it does so at the cost of raising its vulnerability with respect to
more benign scenarios. Since ex-post a large number of banks may find themselves in the
latter situation, there can be a significant rise in the number of insolvencies as a result of
the additional flexibility.
The analysis is very similar to that in the previous section. In particular, a bank's
payment still depends on its choice y' E [0, yo] at date and its forward neighbor's
payment x = q{ ~ (p) at date 1. That is:
q
p
i
l~ k)
(p) = Qi Wo,*} and Q2
(1 ~ k)
(p) = <?2 [vo,x]
for some functions q^ [y' ,x] and q2 [y' ,x]. However, the characterization of the piecewise
functions q\ [y' ,x] and qo [y'o,x] changes a little when condition (19) is not satisfied. In
particular, these functions are identical to those in (26) and (27) in Appendix A. 2 (as in
Section 3) but now there is an additional insolvency region:
y' > y
u
[(/, -x)z].
The critical new element is the bound j/q [(^ — x) z]. This is a function of the losses from
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cross-deposits and is calculated as the level of liquidity hoarding above which the bank 's
loans and liquid reserves (net of losses) would not be sufficient to pay the late depositors
at least /j. That is, j/q [(/] — x) z] is the solution to
Ril-V-Vl [ih - x) z\) + yl [(h -x)z\- (h -x)z= h (1 - u)
.
We refer to scenarios where y' > y$ \{l\ — x) z] as, for lack of a better jargon, scenarios
of precautionary insolvency.
The functions qj [y' ,x] and q2[y'Q) x] remain (weakly) increasing in x. Moreover, we
conjecture as before that the equilibrium is monotonic and distance based (which we
verify below), so the banks' liquidity hoarding decisions still solve problem (21). It can
be verified that all banks (except potentially bank 6p(l+1 ') hoard the level of liquidity
characterized in part (ii) of Proposition 2. In particular, all banks IP t ^uncertain ^
hoard the level of liquidity that the bank with distance k — 3 would hoard in the free-
information benchmark. However, part (i) of the proposition, which characterizes the
equilibrium at date 1, changes once yo exceeds yj.
We divide the cases by the cascade size: K < 2, A' = 3. and K > 4. In the first
two of these cases there is no additional panic relative to the case where banks' flexibility
is limited. If K < 2, each bank b> t B uncertam (p) hoards y^ = 0. The date 1 equilib-
rium in this case is as described in part (i) of Proposition 2, in particular, there are no
precautionary insolvencies and the cascade size is equal to K . Similarly, if K = 3, each
bank b3 6 ^uncertain ^ hoards y
J
=
£/q j>ee < f/o (where the inequality follows since the
transition bank 6PI '~ 31 is solvent in the free-information benchmark). Since ifQ < i/q, it
can be seen that y
J < j/q [(li — x) z], so the banks in B unceTtain (p) are solvent. It follows
that there are no precautionary insolvencies and the equilibrium is again as described in
part (i) of Proposition 2, with a cascade size equal to K = 3.
The new scenarios arise when K > 4. In this case, each bank bP € BUTtcertam (p) hoards
Ho = Vo > y~o i and may experience a precautionary insolvency depending on its losses from
5 To see this, first note that y
J < x/q , which implies
{R-i)vi<RSS-vi = (i-v)R-(i-a)ii-vi,
where the equality follows from Eq. (S). Combining this inequality with the inequality yJQ > (/j — x) z
(since A" < 3. the banks in B uriceTtaln (p) have sufficient liquid reserves at date 1) leads to
v
: < (l-i/)fl-(l-u»/i-«i-r)= _
Vo S ^
_
j - 2/o I'.'i ~ x ) ~l-
Note also that condition (19) implies y
] < yo < Vo an<^ thus rules out precautionary insolvencies by
the above steps,
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cross-deposits. To analyze this case, first note that the bound j/q [(/] — x) z] is decreasing
in (ly — x) z, and thus increasing in x. That is, the more a bank receives from its forward
neighbor, the higher the bound above which it will experience a precautionary insolvency.
Second, note the inequality, tjq [0] < 1 — y (which follows from some algebra and using
/2//1 < R). Then, there are two subcases to consider depending on whether or not the
level of flexible reserves y is greater than y^ [0] (which is the highest value of the bound
y
v [(h-x)z}).
Subcase 1. If j/o is in the interval (j/q [0] , 1 — y], then y is always greater than the
upper bound j/q [(/] — x) z] and a bank b7 experiences a precautionary insolvency regard-
less of the amount x it receives from its forward neighbor. In particular, all banks in
{bp^ £)P('-( 2"- 2 )) j are insolvent. It can be verified that the informed bank 6p(? ' '' averts
insolvency by hoarding some y
p ,t < yQ
l (see Appendix A. 2).
Subcase 2. If yo € [yo^Vo [0])> tnen there exists a unique x [yo] 6 (/j — (3/zJi) that
solves
yt[(h-x[y ])z] = y . (25)
In this case, a bank b3 that hoards yo of liquidity is insolvent if and only if it receives
from its forward neighbor x < x [yo] (so that y% [(/1 — x) z] < yo). By a similar analysis to
that in Section 2.2 for the partial cascades (which we carry out in Appendix A. 2), it can
be checked that there exists K E [K,2n - 1] such that the banks ibp(J\ ... ^(M^" 1 )) j
are insolvent while the banks < bp^~ ^ '
.
.., fr^
1-
'
2" -1 )) I are solvent. In other words, there
is a partial cascade which is at least as large as (and potentially greater than) the partial
cascade in the free-information benchmark.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition. 6
Proposition 3. Suppose assumptions (FS), (17) and (18) are satisfied and conditions
(9), (13), (15) hold. Suppose also that condition (24) (which is the opposite of condition
6 Given the possibility of precautionary insolvencies, one may also wonder whether there could be
multiple equilibria due to banks' coordination failures. Suppose, for example, K = 3, so that the crisis is
contained after 3 banks fail. Could there also be a bad equilibrium in which all banks hoard the maximum
level of liquidity, and their liquidity hoarding decisions are justified since their forward neighbors also
hoard the maximum level of liquidity and experience a precautionary insolvency (thus paying a small
This kind of coordination failure is not possible in our setup, precisely because of conditions (13)
and (15). These conditions ensure that bank bpi-' + 1) is always solvent, even if all other banks hoard the
maximum level of liquidity and experience precautionary insolvencies. To see this, note that the losses
from cross-deposits decrease as we move away from the distressed bank and eventually qP('^ 2 ) > l x — /3/z.
Since bank bpil+l> expects to receive at least l± — 3/z from its forward neighbor, it can avoid insolvency
by hoarding an intermediate level of liquidity. Hence, it is never optimal for bank bpl '~ 1 ^ to undergo a
precautionary insolvency. But once we fix <yp(l + 1 ' = l lt the rest of the equilibrium is uniquely determined
as described above, that is, there is no coordination failure among banks.
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(19)^ holds. For a given financial network b(p), let i — p } (j) denote the slot of the
distressed bank.
(i) For the ex-ante equilibrium (at date 0): Each bank b> £ {bp{T\ bpl- T
- l \ bp(T_2) } C
gknow
^ hoards the same level of liquidity Uq (p) = y
J
,
ree (p) that it would hoard in the
free-information benchmark, while each bank b> 6 B unceTta ' n (p) hoards yfQ (p) = y
f
Q rj (p),
which is the level of liquidity the bank bp^'~ 3 ' would hoard in the free-information bench-
mark. The bank bP 6 p^+l ^ hoards j/q (p) < yfi which is just enough to avert insol-
vency.
(ii) For the continuation equilibrium (at date I): The equilibrium allocation is dis-
tance based and monotonic. There exists a unique K £ [K,2n — 1] such that banks
hp{1\...bp{- J'^K ' 1^\ are insolvent while banks {&p (*-if ) ) .., ^(M2n-i)) j are solvent. The
cascade size K is potentially larger than the cascade size K in the free-information bench-
mark. In particular, there are two cases:
If K < 3, then each bank bP £ B uncerta,n (p) hoards som.e y3Q {p) < y~Q. and avoids a
precautionary insolvency. The cascade size in this case is identical to the free-information
benchmark, i.e. K = K.
If K > 4, then each bank bP £ B uncertain (p) hoards yf (p) = y > yfi, which may lead
to a precautionary insolvency. There are two sub-cases:
If Ho € (l/S [°] - 1 - V)> aU banks b' e B
unceTtam
(p) are insolvent and the cascade
size is given by K = 2n — 1 > K > 4.
If Vo € (yo'^o [0]]- ^ere exists a unique x [j/o] £ ih — P/z, li) characterized by Eq.
(25) such that bank bP £ B unceTtain (p) is insolvent if and only if its forward neighbor's
payment is below x [yo\- The cascade size is an intermediate level K £ [K. 2n — 1].
Discussion. Figure 6 plots the cascade size K as a function of 0, for different levels of
the flexible reserves y . For comparison, the dashed lines plot the cascade size A' in the
free-information benchmark for the same parameters. The top panel corresponds to the
case in which y < yfi, i.e. when condition (19) holds. By Proposition 2, in this case
there are no precautionary insolvencies and the cascade size is the same as the cascade
size in the free-information benchmark. The second panel corresponds to a higher level
of y that satisfies y > y£ . In this case, precautionary insolvencies are possible, and for
sufficiently large 9 more banks are insolvent in the costly audit benchmark than in the
free-information benchmark, i.e. K > K. The third panel shows that, as we increase
j/o, a sufficiently large shock 9 may trigger a collapse of the whole financial system (i.e..
K = 2n - 1).
The bottom panel in Figure 6 shows that as y~Q continues to rise, then at some point the
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Figure 6: The costly-audit equilibrium with precautionary insolvencies. Each
one of the four panels plots the cascade size K as a function of 6 for a different level of
the flexible reserves y (in increasing order of y from top to bottom). The dashed lines
plot the cascade size K in the free-information benchmark.
amplification disappears and again K = K . That is. the effect of the flexible reserves yo
on the size of the cascade K is non-monotonic: The whole financial system collapses with
an intermediate level of yo, but the health of the financial system is restored (and, in fact,
is stronger) with sufficiently high levels of y . The intuition for this non-monotonicity is
the same as the intuition for the non-monotonic effect of y on T . Increasing the level of
flexible reserves yo reduces the cascade size A' in the free-information benchmark. If this
increase in flexibility is not sufficiently large, A" does not fall to manageable levels and the
financial panic remains. As long as there is a financial panic, the increase in y backfires
and. in the current case, it also amplifies the cascade by generating more precautionary
insolvencies. However, if the increase in y is sufficiently large, it may end the financial
panic and restore the health of the financial system.
5 Final Remarks
Our model captures what appears to be a central feature of financial panics: During
severe financial crises the complexity of the environment rises dramatically, and this in
itself causes confusion and financial retrenchment. The perception of counterparty risk
arises even in transactions among apparently sound financial institutions engaged in long
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term relationships. All of a sudden, economic agents are faced with massive uncertainty
as things are no longer business-as-usual. The collapse of Lehman Brothers during the
current financial crisis is one such instance, which froze essentially all private credit mar-
kets and triggered massive run downs of credit lines and withdrawals even from the safest
money market funds.
In the model we capture the complexity of the environment with the size of the partial
cascades. When these cascades are small, banks only need to understand the financial
health of their immediate neighbors to make their decisions. In contrast, when financial
conditions worsen and cascades grow, banks need to understand and be informed about a
larger share of the network. At some point, this is simply too costly and banks withdraw
from intermediation rather than risk exposure to enormous uncertainty, which triggers a
flight to quality.
We also showed that banks' flexibility, defined as their ability to hoard liquidity by
not extending new loans or by selling illiquid assets while in distress, makes it harder
for large cascades to develop, but if they do develop they can trigger more severe credit
crunches and even a collapse in the financial system. Intuitively, a gain in flexibility is
very useful if it succeeds in containing panic, but it can be counterproductive if it does
not as it facilitates banks' withdrawal from intermediation.
An aspect we did not explore in this paper but one which we are currently pursuing
in a related work, is that of secondary markets for loans at date 0. Our preliminary
findings point to yet another amplification aspect of the mechanism we highlight in this
paper: With full information, the distant banks (i.e., the banks with k > K) are the
natural buyers of the loans sold by the distressed banks. However, once distant banks
face uncertainty and become worried that they may be too close to the distressed bank,
the) r cease to buy loans from these banks as they would rather hoard their liquidity, which
exacerbates the network's distress.
There are some obvious policy conclusions that emerge from our framework. For ex-
ample, there is clearly scope for having banks hold a larger buffer than the}' would be
privately inclined to do. Also, transparency measures, by reducing the cost of gathering
information, increase the resilience of the system to a lengthening in potential cascades.
There is even an argument to limit banks' flexibility to cut loan commitments. How-
ever, we are interested in going beyond these observations, and in particular in exploring
the impact of policies that modify the structure of the network. For example, there is
an emerging consensus that the prevalence of bilateral OTC markets for CDS transac-
tions compounded the confusion and complexity of the current financial crisis, and that
it is imperative to organize these transactions in well capitalized exchanges to prevent
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a recurrence. Our framework can help with the formal analysis of this type of policy
considerations. We leave this analysis for future research.
A Appendix
A.l The Normal Environment
The analysis in the text characterizes the equilibrium following a rare event for which the
financial network is not prepared. In this Appendix, we describe the functioning of the
financial network in the normal environment. In particular, we show that the financial
network enables the banks to insure against heterogenous liquidity shocks and facilitates
the flow of liquidity across banks, even if the banks are uncertain about the network
structure.
In the normal environment, there are three aggregate states of the world, denoted by
s (0), s (r) and s (g), revealed at date 0. In state s (0) all banks expect to receive at date 1
the same liquidity shock ui. The states s (r) and s {g) are realized with equal probability
and the liquidity shocks in these states are heterogeneous across banks. More specifically,
the banks are divided half and half between two types: red and green. In state s (r) (resp.
s (g)), the banks with red type (resp. green type) expect to receive a high liquidity shock,
Uff, and the other banks expect to receive a low liquidity shock, ujl . This means that in
states s (r) and s (g) there is enough aggregate liquidity but there is a need to transfer
liquidity across banks.
To transfer liquidity in states s (r) and s {g), the banks form the financial network of
bilateral deposits in (1). We say that the financial network is consistent if all odd slots
(resp. all even slots) contain banks of the same type, which means that red and green
type banks alternate around the financial circle. We restrict the set of feasible networks
to consistent ones (as opposed to, for example, any circular network in which banks may
be arbitrarily ordered around the circle), since these networks ensure that each bank that
needs liquidity has deposits on a bank with excess liquidity, facilitating bilateral liquidity
insurance (see below) with the minimally required level of cross-deposits z in (2).
Banks' types and the financial network are realized as follows: First the types of
banks are realized at random (half of the banks become red type and the other half green
type); then a particular consistent financial network b (p) (with respect to these types) is
realized. Banks' types are their private information, thus the set B in (3) represents the
set of consistent financial networks from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the types
of the banks are realized). This shock structure ensures that the actual realization of the
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Banks' Initio] Balance Sheets
Assets
- y liquid reserves.
- ya flexible reserves.
- 1 — 1/ — yo loans.
Liabilities::
- Measure 1 of demand
deposits that pay / 3 at date 1
or (-, at date 2.
Date
Banks* types axe realised a.t random
A consistent hnanciai network is realised.
NORMAL ENV: State in {:{0),:(r),5{g)} is realised
RARE E\ ENT: State r'(0> is reoteed.
Banks make the audit decision a'
€ {0,1, .
Banks mo.ke the liquidity hoarding, decision y^ 6 |0,"/ ]
(Hquivalently banks extend yo — yi nw' loans. |
Dote 1
Ba.nks make the deposit withdrawal
decision r'
€ [0, r],
Early depositors demand their deposits.
Lo.te depositors demand their deposits
if and only if the bank cannot promise q-_ > ij
insolvent banks (that pay <j, < '])
unload all of their outstanding, loans
Date 2
Banks pay qi to late depositors.
Figure 7: Timeline of events, for both the normal environment and the rare event.
financial network is always consistent while the banks' uncertainty about the financial
network is still described as in the rare event case. In particular, a bank b3 observes the
slots of its neighbors (and since the network is consistent, it also indirectly learns the
types of its neighbors), but it does not know the slots (or the types) of the remaining
banks (b3 j£{p(i-l),p(i)Xi+l)} (see Figure 2). By auditing a3 balance sheets, the bank can
further narrow down the set of possible networks to B3 {p j a3 ).
Figure 7 recaps the timeline of events in this economy both for the normal environment
and the rare event analyzed in the main text. Note that the rare event analyzed in the
main text is characterized by an unanticipated aggregate state s 3 (0) which is very similar
to one of the states in the normal environment (i.e. the state s (0)) except for the fact
that one bank, b3
,
becomes distressed and loses 9 of its liquid reserves.
The equilibrium in the normal environment is a collection of bank
auditing, liquidity hoarding, deposit withdrawal, and payment decisions
[a 3 (p) , j/q (p) , z3 (p) , q[ (p) , cf2 (p)\ , such that, for each realization of the
financial network b (p) and the aggregate state in {s (0) . s (r) , s (<"")}, each bank b3 makes
decisions that maximize the preferences in (4), and the late depositors withdraw deposits
early if and only if qi < h (cf. Eqs. (5) and (6)). We next characterize this equilibrium.
The Normal Functioning of the Financial Network. We claim that, in the normal
emdronment, the financial network facilitates liquidity flow and enables each bank b3 to
pay the contracted values [q\ = l\,q\ = h) in each state of the world. Suppose that a
'J 7

consistent financial network, b (p) and state s (r) is realized, and suppose without loss
of generality that red type banks are assigned to odd slots (the case in which red type
banks are assigned to even slots is symmetric). It suffices to prove the statement for this
case since the case in which s (g) is realized is symmetric to the s (r) case, and the case
in which s (0) is realized is trivial.
We conjecture (and verify below) that each bank b3 chooses not to audit (for any
positive audit costs d{.) > 0) and hoards no liquidity, i.e. a 3 — and y
J
= 0. Consider
the equilibrium at date 1. A red type bank, 6/5 ' 2t-1)
,
(which is assigned to an odd slot by
assumption) needs liquidity so it draws its deposits from the forward neighbor bank, i.e.
chooses zP( 2l
~ 1
^ = z. For each green type bank, bp{2'\ regardless of the financial network
in ,Bp ( 2t) (/?), drawing z^ 2^ £ [0, z] deposits leads to the payments q
p(2l)
= l\ and
„
(2i) (.l-y)R + Z**t\ + (z-Z*2i>)l2
1 - LUL
Since U > h and the preferences are given by (4), the green type banks do not draw their
deposits regardless of their beliefs fp ^
2lS
> (,
| p), i.e. they choose c
p(2!
' = 0. It follows that
liquidity flows through the network at date 1 even though each bank is uncertain about the
network structure. In particular, each bank b3 pays the contracted values (q{ = l^, cf2 — l-i)
in state s (r) (and similarly in states s (g) and s (0)).
We next consider the equilibrium at date and verify our conjecture that the banks
choose not to audit and not to hoard any liquidity. First note that a bank bp ^ l) in need of
liquidity at date 1 is able to obtain it by withdrawing its deposits in the forward neighbor
at a cost of U/h units at date 2 for each unit of liquidity. The bank could also obtain
liquidity by hoarding flexible reserves at date but this would cost R > U/h units for
each unit of liquidity (since R > l2 > h > I). Therefore, each bank bp^ optimally chooses
not to hoard any liquidity at date 0. Second note that a bank's, bp{~'\ optimal actions (for
liquidity hoarding at date and deposit withdrawal at date 1) only depend on its slot i
(and only on its parity), and in particular, it is independent of the financial network in
Bp^ (p). Thus the bank does not benefit from auditing and optimally chooses not to audit,
a P(i) — q (whenever d{.) > 0), thus verifying our conjecture. This completes the proof of
our claim that, in the normal environment, the financial network facilitates liquidity flow
across banks and enables each bank b3 to pay the contracted values [<j[ = l\.qi — h) in
each aggregate state.
2-

A. 2 Proofs Omitted in the Main Text
Proof of Eq. (7) for Sections 2.2 and 3. We claim that all cross-deposits are
fully withdrawn, i.e. Eq. (7) holds, in both the free-information benchmark analyzed
in Section 2.2 and the costly audit model analyzed in Section 3. By condition (9), the
original distressed bank, bp ^ l \ is insolvent thus it withdraws all of its deposits, i.e. : p^ = z.
Suppose that, for some k 6 {0, .., 2n — 1}, bank bp^'~^k+: ^ withdraws all of its deposits in
bank bp(-'~ k) . We claim that bank bp{l ~'^ also withdraws deposits, i.e. z pl-'~ k> = z, which
proves Eq. (7) by induction.
To prove the claim, we first consider the free-information benchmark and analyze two
cases in turn. As the first case, suppose that the forward neighbor of bank bp^~ k%> is
insolvent (i.e. it pays q
p{, - [k- l))
< ^ and qf~
(k ' l))
= 0). Recall that bank bpi '- k > is small
and takes the payment of its forward neighbor as given (see footnote 1), in particular,
it cannot potentially bail out its forward neighbor by withdrawing less than z. This
further implies that the bank withdraws all of its deposits from its forward neighbor, i.e.
z
P(i-k)
_ ;> ^g ^e seconci Case, suppose that the forward neighbor bank, bp^ l~^k~ 1 ''., is
solvent, i.e. q
pi
— h- In this case, bank bp
^'~ k
^ needs liquidity z (to pay its backward
neighbor) and it can obtain this liquidity either by withdrawing its deposits, which costs
U/h units at date 2 per unit of liquidity, or by hoarding flexible reserves at date 0, which
costs R > U/h units per unit of liquidity. Since the former is a cheaper way to obtain
liquidity, bank W* ' withdraws all of its deposits from its forward neighbor, proving our
claim that zp^" k] = z.
Next consider the costly audit model of Section 3. Recall that bank bp{ '~ k) makes
the deposit withdrawal decision before the resolution of uncertainty for cross-deposits
(see Figure 3). As the first case, suppose that bank bp^~ k > assigns a positive probability
to a network structure b (p) such that q
p
(p) < li (that is, suppose the bank
assigns a positive probability that its forward neighbor will be insolvent). Since the bank
takes the payment of its forward neighbor as given and its preferences are given by the
Leontieff form in (18), in this case the bank necessarily withdraws all of its deposits, i.e.
z
p(i-k)
_ z
]\Text SUppose bank bp^~ k^ believes that q
P
(p) = li with probability 1
(that is, the bank knows that its forward neighbor is solvent). In this case, as in the free-
information benchmark, the bank withdraws z p^'~ k ^ = z to meet its liquidity obligations
to its backward neighbor. This completes the proof of the claim and proves Eq. (7) by
induction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Contained in the discussion preceding the proposition.
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Characterization of Banks' Payment Functions q^ [y' ,x] and qi \y' .x} in Section
3. If bank bp(- l ~ k) hoards a level of liquidity y'
€ [0, yo] at date 0, and its forward neighbor
pays x = q
p
(p) at date 1 (and if condition (19) holds), then this bank's payment
is given by functions qi [y' .x] and q2 [y'o-.x} which are characterized as follows:
Case 1. If x e [l\ - /3/z, lj] and y' > (/] - x) z, then
,
,
y'
-(l 1 -x)z + (l-y-y' )R
q x = /j and q2 = > l\. (26)
1 — to
Case 2. If x < lj — /3/z or y' < (lj - x) z, then
y + y' + zx
<?i = 7—: < '1 and q2 = 0. (27)
The first case characterizes the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits
do not exceed its buffer and the bank has hoarded enough flexible reserves to counter
these losses. In this case, the bank is solvent and pays according to (26). The second case
characterizes the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits exceed its buffer,
or when the losses do not exceed the buffer but the bank has not hoarded enough flexible
reserves to counter these losses. In this case, the bank is insolvent and pays according to
(27).
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider part (i) taking as given the characterization
of the liquidity hoarding decisions in part (ii). Note that the liquidity hoarding decision
of each bank depends only on its distance from the distressed bank, which implies that
the payments of banks in the continuation equilibrium can be written as a function of
their distances, i.e. that the equilibrium is distance based. The characterization in part
(ii) shows that each bank bp{J- k) G {bp{T\ bp{1
~ l \ ... £>MMA'-i))} that would be insolvent in
the free-information benchmark hoards y^ = y . and thus it pays the same allocation it
would pay in the free-information benchmark:
Qi [*] = lij'rel (P) < '1 and ^2 [k] = fi (P ) = for k € {0, ... K - 1} . (28)
The bank bp{- l ~K ^> hoards at least as much liquidity as it would hoard in the free-information
benchmark, thus it is solvent given condition (19) (which ensures that hoarding too much
liquidity does not cause insolvency) and pays (cf. Eq. (26)):
Qi[K\ = h andQ 2 [^] > h- (29)
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The banks bpiT~V <= |^-(^+i))
>
^-(^+2))
j ^ foP
(r-(2n-i))|
are soivent and thus pay ( efi
Eq. (26)):
y
p
o
(T- k)
+ (i-y- yf- k) ) R
Q l \k) = h and Q 2 [k] = - '— > h, for k E {A' + 1, .., 2n - 1} .
1 — CO
(30)
In particular, the size of the cascade is K as it is in the free-information benchmark.
Since q
p
l~
ee (p) is increasing in k (see Proposition 1) and j/q is decreasing in k (given
the liquidity hoarding decisions in part (ii)), the characterization in (28) through (30)
also implies that the payments, Qi [k] and Q2 [k], are increasing in k and proves that the
distance based equilibrium is monotonic.
We next turn to the liquidity hoarding decisions at date and prove that the choices
prescribed in part (ii) are optimal. Consider first the banks in B know (p). Comparing the
characterization of the continuation equilibrium in (28) through (30) to the characteriza-
tion in Proposition 1, each bank IP € B know (p) expects to receive the same payment from
its forward neighbor compared to what it would receive in the free-information bench-
mark (i.e. each bank b> 6 B know{p) solves problem (21) with xm = qPj~^~ l)) )- Thus it also
hoards the same level of liquidity that it would hoard in the free-information benchmark.
Next we consider a bank V g B uncertavn [p) which solves problem (21) with ,rm = Q l [2].
We claim that Qi [2] characterized in Eqs. (28) through (30) is equal to q\* ? (the
payment of the forward neighbor of bank 6'3(! ~ 3) in the free-information benchmark), which
in turn proves that the bank b3 hoards the same level of liquidity y
p
Q
!~
ee
that ^(!_3) would
hoard in the free-information benchmark. To prove the claim that Qi[2] = q
p
jree , first
suppose that K < 2. Note that in this case Q\ [2] is given by Eq. (29) or Eq. (30) and in
either case Q\ [2] = l\. Note that by Proposition 1, qp Jree = l\ when K < 2. piwing the
claim in this case. Next suppose K > 3 and note that in this case Qi [2] is given by Eq.
(28) which shows Q 1 [2] = q[ Zel (p), completing the proof of part (ii).
The characterization for the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding for the cases A" <
2. K — 3 and K > 4 then trivially follow from part (ii) and Proposition 1, thus completing
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Most of the proof is contained in the discussion preceding
the proposition. Here, we consider in turn the subcases 1 and 2 (for case A > 4) and we
verify the claims in the main text. We also verify the conjecture that the equilibrium is
distance based and monotonic.
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Subcase 1. If y e (j/q [0] , 1 — y] , then
for any x 6 [0, /]]. This implies that all banks in [bp(- l\ ..., fr/H 1 -' 2 '1
- 2 ))} are insolvent since
they hoard a level of liquidity greater than their corresponding upper limits. These banks'
payments are characterized by the system of equations
o{l-k)
_
, ( p(X-(k-\))
q
^- K > = f^-^»j foreach/ce{l,...2n-2}, (31)
where / (.) is defined in Eq. (12) and the initial condition q
P
is given by Eq. (10) (after
plugging m ^ =/i).
By condition (13), the solution to the above system is increasing (and converges to
the fixed point y + f/o < 1 < M> verifying our conjecture that the equilibrium is distance
based and monotonia By condition (15), we have K < In — 2, which implies qp >
q
p
= q
P
\Tee
Then, since bank £>p( '~ A ' in the free-information benchmark is
able to avert insolvency by hoarding the level J/o/ree — ^o^ the informed bank bp^
+l
^ in
this case can also avert insolvency by hoarding y$ < y^ . It follows that the cascade
size is K — 2n — 1, which is greater than the free-information cascade size K (under
condition (15)), completing the characterization of the date 1 equilibrium in this case.
Subcase 2. If j/o £ (j/o> Vo [0])' there exists a unique x [y ] 6 (/] — yfi/z, l\), character-
ized in Eq. (25) and increasing in t/ , such that a bank b3 t BunceTtam (p) is insolvent
if and only if receives from its forward neighbor x < x[y ]. Using the conjecture that
the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic, we further conjecture that the banks
hpirK...bp^-^'- i y)\ are insolvent while the banks hp^k )
.
...
j/>(M2n-i))j are soivent .
The payments of the banks in < bp(- l\ .., bp ^ l ~^ ~ 1 J) I are characterized by
qf
" fc
> = / {qf-^~
l))
^
for each jfc 6 {l, .., A' - l}
,
(32)
which is an increasing sequence (by condition (13)). Then, either q
P l '
< x [j/o] and
we are back to subcase 1 (i.e. K — 2n — l), or there exists a unique K E [K, 2n — 1] such
that
^-^"•czlSo]^-'*-'". (33)
In the latter case, the banks in hpt- J-KK .., b'M*- 1 )) } C B uncertain (/») are insolvent
(since they receive less than x [yo] from their forward neighbor) but the bank bp ^'
32

is solvent since it receives at least x [j/o] from its forward neighbor. The banks in
\y>{i-{K+i)) ^y,(i-(2n-2)) I
are a|so soivent since the}' receive ^ > x[y ] from their for-
ward neighbors. The informed bank bp^+1 ^ is. also solvent as in subcase 1. Finally, this
analysis implies that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic, completing the
characterization of the date 1 equilibrium in this case.
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